

Exercise 11.1 One-time Pad

Consider three random variables: a message M , a secret key K and a ciphertext C . We want to encode M as a ciphertext C using K with perfect secrecy, so that no one can guess the message from the cipher: $I(C : M) = 0$.

After the transmission, we want to be able to decode the ciphertext: someone that knows the key and the cipher should be able to obtain the message perfectly, i.e. $H(M|C, K) = 0$.

Show that this is only possible if the key contains at least as much randomness as the message, namely $H(K) \geq H(M)$.

First note that

$$\begin{aligned} I(C : M) - I(C : M|K) &= I(M : K) - I(M : K|C) \\ &= I(K : C) - I(K : C|M), \end{aligned}$$

and that mutual information is non-negative. We introduce $x = I(C : M|K)$, $y = I(M : K|C)$ and $z = I(K : C|M)$ and, using $I(C : M) = 0$, we get

$$x - I(C; M) = x = y - I(M; K) = z - I(K; C). \quad (1)$$

Using the two conditions, we write

$$\begin{aligned} H(M) &= H(M|C, K) + I(C : M) + I(K : M|C) = y, \quad \text{and} \\ H(K) &= H(K|M, C) + I(M : K) + I(M : C|K) \geq y - x + z. \end{aligned}$$

However, since $y \geq x$ and $z \geq x$ (from (1)), we get $H(K) \geq H(M)$.

Exercise 11.2 Tightness of secrecy and correctness

Let ρ_{ABE} be the tripartite ccq-state held by Alice, Bob and Eve after a run of a QKD protocol. We showed in the lecture that if the protocol is ε_1 -secret,

$$p_{\text{key}} \delta \left(\rho_{ABE}^{\text{key}}, \tau_A \otimes \rho_E^{\text{key}} \right) \leq \varepsilon_1,$$

and ε_2 -correct,

$$\Pr[A \neq B] \leq \varepsilon_2,$$

then the real and ideal systems are $\varepsilon = \varepsilon_1 + \varepsilon_2$ indistinguishable, i.e.,

$$\exists \sigma_E \text{ such that } \pi_A \pi_B (\mathcal{A} || \mathcal{Q}) \approx_\varepsilon \sigma_E \mathcal{K}. \quad (2)$$

Show that if (2) holds for some ε , then the protocol must be ε -correct and 2ε -secret.

Tip: you cannot assume that (2) is necessarily satisfied by the same simulator used to prove the converse.

Let $\tilde{\rho}_{ABE}$ be the tripartite state held by the distinguisher after interacting with the ideal system $\sigma_E \mathcal{K}$ for an optimal simulator σ_E , and let Γ be the positive operator which projects the AB system on all states with $A \neq B$. Then

$$\varepsilon \geq \delta(\rho_{ABE}, \tilde{\rho}_{ABE}) \geq \delta(\rho_{AB}, \tilde{\rho}_{AB}) \geq \text{tr}[\Gamma(\rho_{AB} - \tilde{\rho}_{AB})] = \Pr[A \neq B]_\rho.$$

The last equality holds because by construction of the ideal key resource \mathcal{K} , $\text{tr}(\Gamma\tilde{\rho}_{AB}) = 0$ (for any simulator σ_E).

Let $p_{\text{key}}\rho_{AE}^{\text{key}}$ be the state of the real AE system held by the distinguisher after projecting on the subspace in which a key is generated, and let $\tilde{p}_{\text{key}}\tau_A \otimes \tilde{\rho}_E^{\text{key}}$ be the state of the ideal AE system for the same projection. Note that we cannot assume that $p_{\text{key}} = \tilde{p}_{\text{key}}$ or $\rho_E^{\text{key}} = \tilde{\rho}_E^{\text{key}}$, since we do not know how the simulator σ_E works.

Since

$$\varepsilon \geq \delta(\rho_{ABE}, \tilde{\rho}_{ABE}) \geq \delta(p_{\text{key}}\rho_{AE}^{\text{key}}, \tilde{p}_{\text{key}}\tau_A \otimes \tilde{\rho}_E^{\text{key}}) \geq \delta(p_{\text{key}}\rho_E^{\text{key}}, \tilde{p}_{\text{key}}\tilde{\rho}_E^{\text{key}}),$$

we have

$$\begin{aligned} p_{\text{key}}\delta\left(\rho_{AE}^{\text{key}}, \tau_A \otimes \rho_E^{\text{key}}\right) &= \delta\left(p_{\text{key}}\rho_{AE}^{\text{key}}, p_{\text{key}}\tau_A \otimes \rho_E^{\text{key}}\right) \\ &\leq \delta\left(p_{\text{key}}\rho_{AE}^{\text{key}}, \tilde{p}_{\text{key}}\tau_A \otimes \tilde{\rho}_E^{\text{key}}\right) + \delta\left(\tilde{p}_{\text{key}}\tau_A \otimes \tilde{\rho}_E^{\text{key}}, p_{\text{key}}\tau_A \otimes \rho_E^{\text{key}}\right) \\ &\leq \varepsilon + \varepsilon. \end{aligned}$$

Exercise 11.3 A min-entropy chain rule

Let ρ_{XZE} be a ccq-state. Show that the following holds:

$$H_{\min}^\varepsilon(X|ZE)_\rho \geq H_{\min}^\varepsilon(X|E)_\rho - \log|\mathcal{Z}|.$$

Recall that

$$\begin{aligned} H_{\min}(X|E)_\rho &:= -\log p_{\text{guess}}(X|E)_\rho, \\ H_{\min}^\varepsilon(X|E)_\rho &:= \max_{\bar{\rho} \in \mathcal{B}^\varepsilon(\rho)} H_{\min}(X|E)_{\bar{\rho}}, \\ \mathcal{B}^\varepsilon(\rho) &:= \{\bar{\rho} : P(\rho, \bar{\rho}) \leq \varepsilon\}, \end{aligned}$$

and that the purified distance $P(\rho, \sigma)$ satisfies the following property. Let $|\varphi\rangle$ be a purification of ρ , then

$$P(\rho, \sigma) = \min_{|\psi\rangle} \delta(|\varphi\rangle, |\psi\rangle),$$

where $|\psi\rangle$ is a purification of σ .

Let $\rho_{XZE} = \sum_{x,z} p_{x,z} |x\rangle\langle x| \otimes |z\rangle\langle z| \otimes \rho_E^{x,z}$ and let $\{\Gamma_x^z\}_x$ be the optimal measurement of the E system to guess x given that $Z = z$. A possible strategy for guessing XZ given E is to pick z uniformly at random then apply the measurement $\{\Gamma_x^z\}_x$ to the E system. This strategy would succeed with probability

$$\sum_{x,z} p_{x,z} \frac{1}{|\mathcal{Z}|} \text{tr}(\Gamma_x^z \rho_E^{x,z}) = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{Z}|} p_{\text{guess}}(X|ZE)_\rho.$$

We thus have

$$p_{\text{guess}}(X|E)_\rho \geq p_{\text{guess}}(XZ|E)_\rho \geq \frac{1}{|\mathcal{Z}|} p_{\text{guess}}(X|ZE)_\rho,$$

hence

$$H_{\min}(X|ZE)_\rho \geq H_{\min}(X|E)_\rho - \log|\mathcal{Z}|.$$

To prove the smooth version, let $\bar{\rho}_{XE} \in \mathcal{B}^\varepsilon(\rho_{XE})$ be the state which maximizes $H_{\min}(X|E)_{\bar{\rho}}$. Let $\bar{\rho}_{XZE}$ be an extension of $\bar{\rho}_{XE}$ such that $P(\rho_{XZE}, \bar{\rho}_{XZE}) = P(\rho_{XE}, \bar{\rho}_{XE})$. By the property of the purified distance, such a state is guaranteed to exist. Then

$$H_{\min}^\varepsilon(X|ZE)_\rho \geq H_{\min}(X|ZE)_{\bar{\rho}} \geq H_{\min}(X|E)_{\bar{\rho}} - \log|\mathcal{Z}| = H_{\min}^\varepsilon(X|E)_\rho - \log|\mathcal{Z}|.$$

Exercise 11.4 Privacy amplification with smooth min-entropy

A function $F : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^d \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$ is a (quantum-proof, strong) (k, ε) -extractor if for all cq states ρ_{XE} with $H_{\min}(X|E) \geq k$ and a uniform Y ,

$$\delta(\rho_{F(X,Y)YE}, \tau_U \otimes \tau_Y \otimes \rho_E) \leq \varepsilon.$$

Show that for any (k, ε) -extractor F , if a cq state ρ_{XE} has smooth min-entropy $H_{\min}^{\bar{\varepsilon}}(X|E) \geq k$, then

$$\delta(\rho_{F(X,Y)YE}, \tau_U \otimes \tau_Y \otimes \rho_E) \leq \varepsilon + 2\bar{\varepsilon}.$$

Let $\bar{\rho}_{XE} \in \mathcal{B}^{\bar{\varepsilon}}(\rho_{XE})$ be the state which maximizes $H_{\min}(X|E)_{\bar{\rho}}$. Then

$$\delta(\bar{\rho}_{F(X,Y)YE}, \tau_U \otimes \tau_Y \otimes \bar{\rho}_E) \leq \varepsilon.$$

Furthermore,

$$\begin{aligned} \delta(\rho_{F(X,Y)YE}, \bar{\rho}_{F(X,Y)YE}) &\leq \delta(\rho_{XE} \otimes \tau_Y, \bar{\rho}_{XE} \otimes \tau_Y) \leq P(\rho_{XE}, \bar{\rho}_{XE}), \\ \delta(\tau_U \otimes \tau_Y \otimes \rho_E, \tau_U \otimes \tau_Y \otimes \bar{\rho}_E) &\leq P(\rho_{XE}, \bar{\rho}_{XE}). \end{aligned}$$

The result follows from two uses of the triangle inequality.